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OPEN ENROLLMENT: WHAT’S IN THE 
BEST INTEREST OF WISCONSIN 
STUDENTS, FAMILIES, AND PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS? 
In 2011, the Wisconsin legislature greatly expanded Wisconsin’s open 
enrollment program by lengthening the regular application window and 
creating a year-round alternative application procedure with a vague and 
undefined best interest of the pupil standard.  This Comment addresses 
the Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program in the larger context of school 
choice, its recent amendments, and the resulting obstacles to ensure equal 
educational opportunities for all Wisconsin students.  It suggests that the 
continued expansion of open enrollment without sufficiently defined 
standards undermines local control and opts to further a handful of 
individual students at the expense of the collective statewide population.  
Further, this Comment advocates for a return to a more limited and 
defined version of open enrollment and alternatively proposes a 
balancing test by which to weigh the best interests of each student against 
the administrative, financial, and equitable implications of open 
enrollment that impact the effective operation of public schools.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Private investigators, criminal prosecution, and amnesty programs—
once distant topics from public education—are increasingly seen 
nationwide in school residency disputes.  In California, roughly 300 
families came forward after a San Francisco school district offered 
amnesty to families unlawfully enrolled in a high performing district.1  
Additionally, an Ohio mother was convicted of a felony and sentenced 
to five years in prison after falsifying records and enrolling her kids in a 
highly-ranked neighboring district.2  Similarly, a homeless mother in 
Connecticut faced charges for first-degree larceny and up to twenty 
years in prison for stealing roughly $16,000 in education by registering 
her son in her babysitter’s school district rather than the mother’s last 
known residence, a “significantly poorer urban district.”3 
An administrator of a high performing district recognized that “[a]t 
the root of it all [is] people who wanted the best for their children.”4  
One parent who was prosecuted for enrolling her daughter in a better, 
neighboring district stated, “[l]ike any parent, I was just looking out for 
my daughter.”5  Another commentator explained that these cases 
demonstrate “how desperately parents want access to better schools.”6  
 
1. Kantele Franko, Kelley Williams-Bolar Case Highlights Schools’ Efforts to ID Fake 
Student Addresses, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2011, 9:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.c
om/2011/02/25/schools-boost-efforts-to-_n_828275.html. 
2. The mother was sentenced to five years in prison, is on probation for three years, and 
must perform eighty hours of community service.  Douglas Stanglin, Ohio Mom Jailed for 
Falsely Enrolling Kids in Better School, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2011, 2:01 PM), 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/01/ohio-mom-jailed-for-
enrolling-kids-in-better-school-district/1#.UODavLbR07C. 
3. See Stephanie Reitz, Tanya McDowell, Conn. Mom, Pleads Not Guilty in School 
Enrollment Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2011, 2:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/2011/04/27/tanya-mcdowell-not-guilty-plea_n_854377.html; see also Peter Applebome, In a 
Mother’s Case, Reminders of Educational Inequalities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at A18. 
4. Franko, supra note 1. 
5. Id.  
6. Stephanie Reitz, Kelley Williams-Bolar, Tanya McDowell Cases Raise Fairness 
Questions, HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
05/10/school-residency-cases_n_860107.html. 
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Yet, rather than address the inherently inequitable school finance 
system based largely on property taxes,7 the primary response to this 
disparity has been to provide students with educational options through 
the expansion of school choice programs. 
Wisconsin, in particular, has been at the forefront of the nationwide 
school choice debate.  In 1990, Wisconsin enacted the first government-
funded private voucher program in the country, the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (MPCP), which provides governmental funding directly 
to families in the form of a voucher that may be used to pay tuition at a 
participating private school.8  Initially limited to 1,000 students from 
families with income at or below 175% of the federal poverty level,9 the 
MPCP has expanded to families with income at or below 300% of the 
federal poverty level and over 110 participating private schools with 
25,820 students in the 2013–2014 academic year.10   
 
7. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional 
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1330 (1992) (noting that states largely fund public education 
through local property taxes, which “results in greater expenditures on education in those 
areas where property values are highest”); see also infra notes 71, 82 (noting that the school 
finance system based on property taxes in most states has been consistently upheld as 
constitutional at both the state and federal levels).  However, a few state supreme courts have 
declared that the states’ system of financing public education that relies heavily on local 
property taxes discriminates against the poor and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 
806, 815–16 (Ariz. 1994); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (recognizing “that 
the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be 
conditioned on wealth”); Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 
(Wyo. 1980). 
8. JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
AMERICA’S FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM 3 (2000); SUSAN MITCHELL, WIS. POLICY 
RESEARCH INST., HOW SCHOOL CHOICE ALMOST DIED IN WISCONSIN 4 (Vol. 12, No. 6 
1999) (describing the Milwaukee voucher program as a “national laboratory for school choice 
and its impact on families”); see also Peter M. Kimball, Comment, Opening the Door to 
School Choice in Wisconsin: Is Agostini v. Felton the Key?, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 843, 847–48 
(1998). 
9. Kimball, supra note 8, at 848.  
10. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, MPCP FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2013–2014 
(2013), available at sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/doc/mpcp_14fnf_2013_11.doc; PUB. POLICY 
FORUM, SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN SCHOOL CHOICE: MORE SCHOOLS, MORE STUDENTS, 
FEWER LIMITS ON INCOME ELIGIBILITY 1, 3 (Vol. 100, No. 1 2012) [hereinafter SIGNIFICANT 
GROWTH IN SCHOOL CHOICE], available at http://publicpolicyforum.org/research/significant-
growth-school-choice-more-schools-more-students-fewer-limits-income-eligibility.  The 
MPCP is now in its twenty-third year, yet it has failed to produce expected gains in student 
academic achievement.  See PUB. POLICY FORUM, CHOICE SCHOOLS HAVE MUCH IN 
COMMON WITH MPS, INCLUDING STUDENT PERFORMANCE 1 (Vol. 101 No. 1 2013), 
available at http://publicpolicyforum.org/sites/default/files/2013VoucherBrief-Clarified_1.pdf 
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A few years after the creation of the MPCP, Wisconsin launched one 
of the first statewide inter-district open enrollment programs in 1997 
that allow students to attend any public school, regardless of the 
student’s residentially zoned district.11  During the first year of open 
enrollment in Wisconsin, there were 2,464 student transfers and a total 
of $9.6 million in per-pupil funding transferred from one school district 
to another.12  Fast-forward fourteen years and the numbers climbed to 
41,562 student transitions with a total of $242.8 million in funds 
transferred between districts in the 2012–2013 academic year.13  
Although open enrollment has received less attention than its school 
choice counterpart—voucher programs14—the constitutional, financial, 
and equitable concerns are similarly profound and, perhaps, of greater 
significance given the statewide scope.15   
This Comment will address recent amendments to Wisconsin’s open 
enrollment statute that greatly expand the scope of the program and 
carry significant implications for local school districts, and consequently, 
 
(noting that MPCP student proficiency rates on state standardized exams “tend to be slightly 
below the proficiency rates of students in MPS”); Alan J. Borsuk, Choice May Not Improve 
Schools, Study Says: Report on MPS Comes from Longtime Supporter of Plan, MILWAUKEE 
J. SENTINEL, Oct. 24, 2007, at 1A.  Despite these questionable academic results, “[i]f MPCP 
were a Wisconsin Public School District, it would be the third largest in the state, behind 
Milwaukee and Madison districts.”  SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN SCHOOL CHOICE, supra at 3.  
Ironically, the MPCP initially passed constitutional muster on the basis of its limited 
applicability and experimental nature, although it has since survived multiple state 
constitutional challenges.  Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 853–54, 578 N.W.2d 602, 611 
(1998) (holding that the MPCP does not violate the Establishment Clause); Davis v. Grover, 
166 Wis. 2d 501, 530, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (1992) (holding that the MPCP does not violate the 
state Uniformity Clause because participating schools do not constitute “district schools” 
within the meaning of the state constitution despite public funding). 
11. See LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, OPEN ENROLLMENT PROGRAM TRANSFER 
AMOUNT ALTERNATIVES 3 (2011) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN 
ENROLLMENT]. 
12. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, PUBLIC SCHOOL OPEN ENROLLMENT BY THE 
NUMBERS (2013), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/oe_psoe_at_a_glance.pdf. 
13. Id. 
14. See infra notes 22, 25 and accompanying text. 
15. Deven Carlson et al., The Determinants of Interdistrict Open Enrollment Flows: 
Evidence from Two States, 33 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 76, 76 (2011) 
(“Interdistrict open enrollment is the most widely used form of school choice in the United 
States.”); Lorna Jimerson, Interdistrict Open Enrollment: The Benign Choice?, 76 CLEARING 
HOUSE 16, 16 (2002) (noting that open enrollment appears to be a “relatively benign policy in 
the midst of frenzied debate about other choice options” and that it “generates meager 
debate in the public arena”).  See generally infra Part III (discussing the constitutional, 
financial, and equitable implications of inter-district open enrollment in Wisconsin). 
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Wisconsin families.16  Part II of this Comment will discuss open 
enrollment in the larger context of school choice, including arguments 
for and against, as well as the state and federal constitutional 
framework.  Part III will detail the Wisconsin Open Enrollment 
Program in the wake of the 2011 legislative amendments, with an 
emphasis on the new statutory best interest exception that effectively 
permits year-round open enrollment transfers.17  The discussion 
highlights that the recent expansion of open enrollment creates 
challenges for local school districts to effectively plan space availability, 
stabilize budgets, and ensure equitable educational services for all 
students. 
Part III then draws attention to a key lobbying force behind the 
legislative amendments—the for-profit, virtual education industry—and 
notes how the expansion of open enrollment significantly advanced the 
rise of virtual education in Wisconsin, an industry that has proven 
largely ineffective.  Finally, Part IV advocates reigning in the continued 
expansion of open enrollment.  This Comment does not suggest 
eliminating open enrollment in Wisconsin public schools.  Rather, it 
advocates for a return to a more controlled and limited version of the 
program that existed prior to the 2011 amendments by repealing the 
best interest exception.  In the alternative, Part IV proposes a balancing 
test by which to weigh the best interests of each student against the 
administrative, financial, and equitable implications of open enrollment 
that impact the effective operations of public schools.  This Comment 
suggests that year-round open enrollment without sufficiently defined 
standards undermines local control and operates against the best 
interest of all children in Wisconsin. 
II. SCHOOL CHOICE: OPEN ENROLLMENT IN CONTEXT 
A. Unraveling School Choice 
School choice has become a “cornerstone of federal educational 
policy,” yet many do not understand the basic framework, much less its 
 
16. See generally Memorandum from Anne Sappenfield, Senior Staff Attorney, Wis. 
Legislative Council (Feb. 17, 2012).  
17. The best interest exception permits year-round open enrollment when it is in the 
best interest of the child.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
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nuances and implications.18  The word “choice” is a political goldmine as 
it appeals to a fundamental democratic value—the right to choose—
while being apolitical on its face.19  Even though the inherent ambiguity 
may be useful politically, it has caused much confusion.20  Nonetheless, 
the various educational arrangements under the umbrella of school 
choice can be boiled down to two primary categories: choices within the 
public school system and choices between public and private schools.21  
Private school choice programs, such as vouchers and tuition tax credits, 
have raised significant constitutional concerns under the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment because they permit students to attend 
private—and often religious—schools with public resources.22  
Additionally, voucher programs are largely confined to urban cities with 
a high concentration of poverty and are limited to low-income families.23   
On the other hand, public school choice options such as magnet 
schools, charter schools, post-secondary enrollment, and open 
 
18. Chia-Lin Hsieh & Jianping Shen, Is School Choice a Mechanism for Sustaining 
Change? Implications from a National Survey, 75 CLEARING HOUSE 88, 88 (2001).   
19. Angela Slate Rawls, Comment, Eliminating Options Through Choice: Another Look 
at Private School Vouchers, 50 EMORY L.J. 363, 363 (2001); Kimball, supra note 8, at 843 
(quoting Tommy Thompson, Governor of Wis., State of the State Address, Address Before 
the Joint Convention (Jan. 29, 1997), in SENATE J., 1997–1998 SESSION, at 54, 57). 
20. See generally Kim K. Metcalf & Polly A. Tait, Free Market Policies and Public 
Education: What Is the Cost of Choice?, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 65, 67 (1999) (noting the 
“tremendous confusion that exists over the effects” of school choice); Angela G. Smith, 
Public School Choice and Open Enrollment: Implications for Education, Desegregation, and 
Equity, 74 NEB. L. REV. 255, 275 (1995) (“[T]he vagueness of the concept of choice enhances 
its political appeal because the term can be construed to mean various things.”). 
21. Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the 
Polemic of Legal Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 10–24 (1993) (providing an 
overview of public and private school choice); Hsieh & Shen, supra note 18, at 88.
22. WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, SCHOOL CHOICE IN WISCONSIN 1, 10 
(1995); see also R. KENNETH GODWIN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE 
TRADEOFFS: LIBERTY, EQUITY, AND DIVERSITY 7 (2002).  
23. ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON ET AL., SCHOOL CHOICE AND SEGREGATION BY 
RACE, CLASS, AND ACHIEVEMENT 9 (2008), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/CHO
ICE-08-Mickelson-FINAL-EG043008.pdf (noting that voucher programs to date have been 
targeted at “low-income students in urban schools”).  However, voucher programs are 
beginning to expand.  SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 10, at 1.  In 
2011, amendments to the MPCP contained a provision that expanded school choice programs 
in cities outside of Milwaukee, which led to the creation of the Parental Private School 
Choice Program in Racine and a small statewide version in various cities.  Id.  The program in 
Racine allows 250 students to attend; within the first year, eight schools enrolled 228 students.  
Id. at 11. 
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enrollment allow parents to shop among various public school options.24  
In contrast to voucher programs that have been steeped in controversy 
for decades,25 open enrollment programs have not been as extensively 
examined and have received significantly less attention nationwide.26  
However, as of 2013, forty-six states had enacted some form of an open 
enrollment policy,27 most of which are statewide and mandatory, as 
opposed to the more limited and largely regional private school choice 
voucher programs.28  Because open enrollment impacts a substantially 
larger segment of the populace than voucher programs, its implications 
in the school choice debate should not be overlooked. 
Although the structure of open enrollment programs vary from state 
to state,29 there are two primary forms implemented across the country: 
intra-district and inter-district, which may be voluntary or mandatory 
programs.30  Intra-district open enrollment programs permit students to 
attend any school within their resident school district, space permitting.31  
On the other hand, inter-district programs permit students to cross 
school district lines and attend any public school, even if it is outside of 
the district the student is residentially zoned to attend, so long as the 
 
24. KIM SHEANE & LOUANN BIERLEIN, OPEN ENROLLMENT/EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: 
A NATIONAL REVIEW 8–10 (1991) (describing characteristics of charter schools, magnet 
schools, and post-secondary enrollment programs); see also DAVID DODENHOFF, WIS. 
POLICY RESEARCH INST., THE LIMITS OF PARENT-DRIVEN REFORM 5–6 (Vol. 20, No. 8 
2007), available at http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/Vol20no8.pdf; Kimball, supra note 8, at 
843.  See generally WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 22.  
25. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 57 (explaining that the “most heated 
debates over choice” center around voucher programs and describing in particular the 
controversy surrounding the Milwaukee Public School Voucher Program); David M. Welsch 
et al., An Examination of Inter-District Public School Transfers in Wisconsin, 29 ECON. 
EDUC. REV. 126, 127–28 (2010).  See generally Greg Todd, Comment, “Fully Participating” 
Voucher Programs and the Wisconsin Template: A Brick or a Breach in the Wall of Church-
State Separation?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 710 (2000) (analyzing the constitutionality of 
Milwaukee voucher program). 
26. See Carlson et al., supra note 15, at 76 (“[I]nterdistrict open enrollment [has] largely 
flown below the radar screen of scholars and policy analysts.”); Welsch et al., supra note 25. 
27. Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia have 
not enacted an open enrollment policy.  See EDUC. COMM’N. OF THE STATES, OPEN 
ENROLLMENT: 50-STATE REPORT (2013), available at http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/report.aspx? 
id=268. 
28. Alan Wolfe, The Irony of School Choice: Liberals, Conservatives, and the New 
Politics of Race, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE 31, 34 (Alan Wolfe ed., 2003). 
29. Jimerson, supra note 15, at 16.  
30. EDUC. COMM’N. OF THE STATES, supra note 27.  Some states have adopted a 
mixture of both inter- and intra-district enrollment.  See Smith, supra note 20, at 266–68. 
31. Smith, supra note 20, at 266.  
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nonresident school has space available and the parents comply with the 
requisite procedures.32 
For example, the Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program, further 
detailed in Part III, operates statewide and requires a parent to submit 
an application to the school district the student wishes to attend during a 
specified time frame,33 unless the student satisfies one of seven 
exceptions.34  The participating nonresident school district must then 
accept potential students on a random basis using certain acceptance 
criteria, although preference may be given to students and siblings of 
students who are already attending the nonresident district.35  The 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) then transfers a 
specified amount of student aid to the nonresident, receiving school 
district.36  Intra-district programs are significantly less problematic as 
compared to inter-district programs because the district revenue stays 
put and other issues of equity are of lesser concern.37  As a result, this 
Comment focuses on the implications of the inter-district open 
enrollment program in Wisconsin. 
B. Arguments For and Against Open Enrollment 
Because of the ambiguity surrounding school choice, it is often 
appealing to both political parties, although for different reasons.38  
While some conservatives consider the free market the “silver bullet” to 
improve schools, some liberals view school choice as a vehicle for social 
equality.39  In general, advocates of open enrollment favor the injection 
 
32. Hsieh & Shen, supra note 18, at 88; see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE PI § 36.03 (Sept. 
2012); Elaine M. McGillivray, Comment, The New Minnesota Miracle?: A Critique of Open 
Enrollment in Minnesota’s Public Schools, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 105, 107 (1990). 
33. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3)(a)(1) (2011–2012). 
34. Id. § 118.51(3m)(a); see also infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
35. Id. § 118.51(3)(a)(2); see also infra note 111 (noting that students may begin 
attending a nonresident school district before the open enrollment application has been 
approved or denied). 
36. See infra note 158 and accompanying text (noting that the costs associated with each 
student transfer for the 2011–2012 academic year was $6,867 per student). 
37. See infra Part III.G (discussing equitable concerns of inter-district open enrollment). 
38. JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET 
METAPHOR 21 (1994) (“[G]iven the combination of potent appeal and fundamental 
ambiguity, it is not surprising that choice is a label simultaneously pursued by the political 
right and left alike.”).   
39. MICKELSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 3–4; see also McGillivray, supra note 32, at 114 
(“‘[Liberals support choice also].  Many are calling choice ‘empowering,’ a way within the 
public school system to extend to all the freedom wealthy families have always had: choosing 
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of the free market into public education to increase competition and, 
ultimately, improve the quality of educational services.40  Under this 
market theory approach that makes room for consumer choices, the 
overall education system is enhanced because schools are forced to 
either improve or shut down,41 as opposed to the public school system 
that provides “no incentive to improve.”42  Instead, choice schools must 
“work to keep their customers,”43 unlike the traditional, monopolistic 
public schools that are “complacent, lethargic, inefficient, and 
unresponsive to the needs of most students.”44  In addition to injecting 
the competitive spirit of the free market, open enrollment empowers 
parents to take a more active role in their child’s education,45 which 
proponents argue ultimately improves student performance.46  Not only 
does the program induce systemic change, but it can also “rescue 
children from bad schools” by providing access to high performing 
schools that would otherwise be inaccessible.47 
In contrast, opponents often adhere to the equity theory, which 
criticizes the commoditization of public education and argues that a 
market-based approach wrongfully transforms public education into a 
 
where and how their children will be educated.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kathleen 
Sylvester, Schools of Choice: A Path to Educational Quality or ‘Tiers of Inequity’?, 
GOVERNING, July 1989, at 50–51)). 
40. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 19–23 (explaining the arguments in favor of 
school choice); see also Smith, supra note 20, at 277. 
41. Smith, supra note 20, at 277–84 (discussing the market theory versus the equity 
theory).  Research conducted in Wisconsin indicates that districts that lose students 
experience slightly higher test scores in the following academic year.  David M. Welsch & 
David M. Zimmer, Do Student Migrations Affect School Performance? Evidence from 
Wisconsin’s Inter-District Public School Program, 31 ECON. EDUC. REV. 195, 206 (2012).  
Although the evidence may suggest the competitive effect of open enrollment works, Welsch 
and Zimmer note that the result may stem from the departure of low-performing students.  
Id. at 205. 
42. EMILY VAN DUNK & ANNELIESE M. DICKMAN, SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE 
QUESTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY: THE MILWAUKEE EXPERIENCE 1 (2003).  
43. See id. at 1–2; Dodenhoff, supra note 24, at 4; Daniel, supra note 21, at 9–24 
(providing an overview of public and private school choice); see also Hsieh & Shen, supra 
note 18, at 88.   
44. Daniel, supra note 21, at 25. 
45. See McGillivray, supra note 32, at 109–10. 
46. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 20 (noting that choice encourages parents 
to become “consumers of education rather than targets of social policy” and that research 
indicates greater involvement of parents increases student academic success). 
47. SHEANE & BIERLEIN, supra note 24, at 1, 8–10.  
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product, where some students benefit and other students do not.48  
Under this approach, school choice improperly leads to a form of social 
Darwinism that treats public schools like supermarkets, where parents 
and students are now customers that dictate the success and failure of 
public schools.49  Except the system compromises the quality of 
education received by those students in the losing school districts, rather 
than some inadequate commodity on the shelves of the local grocery 
store.50  Opponents of school choice further argue that business cannot 
serve as a model for public schools because the nature of public schools 
“stress[es] collective goods and collective values,” unlike the nature of 
the free market, which furthers the individual at the expense of the 
collective.51  Further, there appears to be a lack of evidence that students 
who attend choice public schools experience enhanced academic 
achievement.52  Other criticisms of open enrollment include the loss of 
local control,53 increased social and racial segregation,54 and equitable 
 
48. Smith, supra note 20, at 279; see also infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text 
(explaining situations where open enrollment creates “more losers than winners” throughout 
Wisconsin).  
49. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 38 (explaining that parents who did not 
participate in school choice programs “did not see education as a ‘commodity’ over which 
they could exercise power as consumers”); Patrick E. Mascia, Comment, Open Enrollment: 
Social Darwinism at Work, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 443 (1990). 
50. As the California Supreme Court noted, “[u]nequal education, then, leads to 
unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped ability to participate in the 
social, cultural, and political activity of our society.”  Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 
(Cal. 1971) (quoting San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 
1971)). 
51. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 25; see also Daniel, supra note 21, at 26. 
52. Jimerson, supra note 15, at 19 (“[N]o evidence conclusively proves that the act of 
choosing improves students’ academic achievement.”). 
53. McGillivray, supra note 32, at 123–27. 
54. Although desegregation reached a peak at the end of the 1980s, the last two 
decades—since the implementation and widespread adoption of school choice—have seen 
increased re-segregation by race and socioeconomic status.  MICKELSON ET AL., supra note 
23, at 6–7.  “In fact, open enrollment plans allow more advantaged students to transfer to 
relatively whiter, more affluent school systems, thereby exacerbating race and [socioeconomic 
status] inequality between districts.”  Id. at 12; see also Jimerson, supra note 15, at 17 (“Most 
studies . . . indicate that choice causes increased stratification along ethnic and socioeconomic 
lines.” (citing BRIAN P. GILL ET AL., RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY: WHAT WE KNOW AND 
WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT VOUCHERS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 181 (2001))); 
Cynthia Boyd, Minnesota’s New ‘White Flight’: School Open-Enrollment Program, MINNPOST 
(Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.minnpost.com/community-sketchbook/2013/01/minnesota-s-new-
white-flight-school-open-enrollment-program (noting that the state open enrollment program 
has resulted in increased racial segregation and the districts gaining students from open 
enrollment are “predominantly white districts becoming whiter”). 
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concerns that address whether it is fundamentally the nature of public 
education to pit school districts against one another, thereby creating 
“winning” and “losing” school districts.55 
The two opposing theoretical approaches to open enrollment 
implicate a fundamental clash between the purposes of public 
education.56  Under the market theory, the purpose of education is to 
benefit the individual,57 whereas the equity theory seeks to benefit 
society at large.58  One commentator noted that “[w]hen it comes to 
education policy, Americans want it all,” but when faced with the trade-
off between freedom of choice and equality of opportunity “Americans 
will nearly always choose freedom.”59  Accordingly, the expansion of 
school choice continues to be an attractive alternative for parents who 
are disillusioned with their children’s current public school placements. 
C. Why Parents Choose 
A comprehensive review of open enrollment requires an inquiry into 
the basic question of what motivates parent decisions to transfer 
students from one public school district to another.  Not surprisingly, 
students transfer to districts that have higher test scores,60 have higher 
median income,61 have higher academic standards,62 and are generally in 
safer neighborhoods.63  A recent in-depth study in Wisconsin concluded 
that parents are attracted to districts that have high achievement, high 
 
55. McGillivray, supra note 32, at 126. 
56. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 13–14 (“Publicly funded education creates 
an inherent tension between the right of parents to transmit their culture to their children and 
the right of society to use the educational system to produce the values that society believes 
are critical to its continuance.”).   
57. Smith, supra note 20, at 279–80. 
58. Id. 
59. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 1 (“We demand better test score results for 
all students, greater equality of opportunity, respect for diversity, preparation for good 
citizenship, efficiency, regulatory accountability, the development of autonomy in students, 
and preparation for jobs in a postindustrial society.  But it is impossible to maximize 
educational performance in all these areas at the same time.”); Wolfe, supra note 28, at 42–43 
(explaining that overall, Americans value freedom more than equality). 
60. Randall Reback, Demand (and Supply) in an Inter-District Public School Choice 
Program, 27 ECON. EDUC. REV. 402, 403 (2008).   
61. See Richard Fossey, Open Enrollment in Massachusetts: Why Families Choose, 16 
EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 320, 324 (1994). 
62. DAVID J. ARMOR & BRETT M. PEISER, COMPETITION IN EDUCATION: A CASE 
STUDY OF INTERDISTRICT CHOICE 122–23 (1997).   
63. See GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 9. 
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spending, more extracurricular activities, and a low percentage of 
minorities.64  The study also concluded that students are transferring 
from districts that have high property values, but low tax rates, 
“suggest[ing] that families may avoid paying higher taxes while at the 
same time benefitting from the higher spending on education.”65  
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that convenience, parent perception of 
the school, and parent dissatisfaction heavily contribute to open 
enrollment choices.66  Other reasons include ease of transportation, 
proximity to a parent’s workplace, and program shopping.67  The 
underlying motivations for district transfers provide a useful vantage 
point from which to analyze the recent amendments to the Wisconsin 
Open Enrollment Program, as will be discussed in Part III. 
D. Federal and State Constitutional Context 
While open enrollment has received less attention than voucher 
programs, the constitutional implications are similarly profound.  At 
both the federal and state levels, there seems to be a disconnect between 
the supportive rhetoric and the practical realities within education law, 
which significantly impacts the practical implementation of open 
enrollment.  Despite the famous language from Brown v. Board of 
Education that “education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments,”68 the United States Supreme Court held 
that education is not a federal fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution in San Antonio Independent 
 
64. Welsch et al., supra note 25, at 132–36; see also GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 
22, at 8 (“Research on magnet schools and open enrollment programs shows that unless a 
choice policy includes provisions that prevent it, white parents will choose schools that enroll 
a lower percentage of minority students than the school their children left.”). 
65. Welsch et al., supra note 25, at 132. 
66. Amy Hetzner, Higher Spending, Test Scores Attract More Students, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 2009, at B1 (citing Stockbridge School District Superintendent Dave 
Moscinski, who noted that “perception plays a key role in school district choices, whether that 
is based on actual performance or not” and parent Stacy Juhl, who utilizes open enrollment 
based on convenience); see also Sara Kuhl, Open Enrollment Makes Schools More 
Competitive, Study Says, U. OF WISCONSIN-WHITEWATER (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.uww.e 
du/news/archive/2012-02-open-enrollment (noting that parent dissatisfaction is likely a key 
reason for student transfers). 
67. Kuhl, supra note 66 (“If a student is very interested in robotics, but your district 
doesn’t have a robotics program, it makes sense to change districts.” (quoting David Welsch, 
Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
68. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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School District v. Rodriguez.69  In addition, although the Supreme Court 
recognizes public schools as a matter of “supreme importance” and the 
“most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system 
of government,”70 Rodriguez held that the Texas school finance system 
based on property taxes, which resulted in wealth inequality between 
districts, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.71  Thus, state action as it relates to the financing of public 
education must merely be rationally related to legitimate state 
purposes,72 whereas a complete deprivation of education is subjected to 
strict scrutiny and more likely to be deemed unconstitutional.73 
Although there is no federal fundamental right to education, state 
constitutions have taken different approaches on the issue.74  For 
example, Wisconsin has defined education as a fundamental right 
subject to strict scrutiny75 pursuant to Article X, Section 3 of the state’s 
constitution, which states: 
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of 
district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; 
and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to 
all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian 
instruction shall be allowed therein.76 
Even though education is a fundamental right, Wisconsin case law 
has broadly interpreted the requirement that district schools be as 
 
69. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the 
Constitution.”). 
70. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 
(1963) (Brennan J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)). 
71. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (noting that the school finance system did not operate to 
the disadvantage of a suspect class). 
72. Id. at 40. 
73. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (“We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our 
Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which 
our social order rests.”).  Plyler involved the deprivation of public school funding for 
undocumented children.  Id. at 205, 221. 
74. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc) (interpreting 
ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 6); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. 
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977) (interpreting CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1).  But see, 
e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982) (interpreting COLO. 
CONST. art. IX, § 2 and holding that education is not a fundamental right).  
75. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 567, 579–80, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149, 155 (1976).  
76. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (emphasis added).  
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nearly uniform as practicable—known as the Uniformity Clause—to 
provide “not a ceiling but a floor” of “certain minimal educational 
opportunities.”77  The Uniformity Clause has been interpreted to refer 
to the “character of instruction” provided in Wisconsin public schools 
rather than the “method of forming school districts.”78  However, the 
Uniformity Clause does require “[a]n equal opportunity for a sound 
basic education . . . that will equip students for their roles as citizens and 
enable them to succeed economically and personally.”79  While open 
enrollment implicitly assumes public schools are not uniform,80 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that “absolute uniformity” is not 
required.81  As a result, any disparity resulting from the school finance 
system based largely on property taxes was held not to violate the 
Wisconsin Constitution, so long as each school district is adequately or 
minimally funded.82 
Similar to the rationale in Rodriguez,83 a rational basis standard of 
review is applied to school finance mechanisms in Wisconsin because 
the rights implicated “are premised upon spending disparities and not 
upon a complete denial of educational opportunity.”84  In Vincent v. 
 
77. Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 61, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388 (quoting Davis 
v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 639, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (1992); Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 
835, 894–95, 578 N.W.2d 602, 628 (1998)). 
78. Id. ¶ 31 (quoting State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 290, 221 N.W. 860, 862 
(1928)); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 520, 436 N.W.2d 568, 589 (1989) (Bablitch, J. 
dissenting) (“Character of instruction has been more recently expressed as ‘services, 
procedures, opportunities or rules’ provided in district schools.” (quoting Zweifel v. Joint 
Dist. No. 1, Belleville, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 653, 251 N.W.2d 822, 824 (1977))). 
79. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 51. 
80. McGillivray, supra note 32, at 127 (“Open enrollment can be construed as an 
admission that schools are not uniform.”). 
81. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 68. 
82. Id. (“[A] school finance system that uniformly funds school districts to provide a 
basic level of education is constitutional.”). 
83. Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (“[N]o 
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to 
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full 
participation in the political process.”), with Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) 
(finding a fundamental right to education and holding that the school financing system based 
on property taxes was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
84. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 83 (quoting Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 498, 436 
N.W.2d 568, 580 (1989)) (“We carefully distinguish between the fundamental right to an 
equal opportunity for a sound basic education under art. X, § 3 and the wealth-based 
arguments the Petitioners make.  In other words, the fundamental right to an equal 
opportunity for a sound basic education does not rest on any classification based on 
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Voight, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that there was insufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the basic education afforded to students in 
property-poor school districts was inferior to the education received by 
students in property-rich districts.85  Ultimately, the court noted that 
there was no proof of “poor standardized test scores, college entrance 
rates, or the like.”86  In the end, “[m]erely showing disparity of the 
financial resources among school districts is not enough in this state to 
prove a lack of equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education . . . .  Wisconsin requires districts to fulfill a constitutional 
minimum educational offering, not a maximum.”87  In light of the 
constitutional minimum guarantee, local districts are able to raise and 
expend funds above and beyond the threshold required by the state.88  
Thus, significant wealth disparity between school districts has been 
given the rubber stamp of approval by the federal government and 
many state governments, such as Wisconsin, by merely affording 
rational review, rather than strict scrutiny. 
If Rodriguez or Vincent were revisited today, it is possible, and 
likely, that the outcomes would be different.89  One commentator noted 
that the Rodriguez decision “is more like a fragile scale that is quite 
capable of being tipped”90 due to strong dissenting opinions that 
 
wealth. . . .  Since the Petitioners’ argument rests on wealth-based classifications and not 
classifications based on art. X, § 3, we apply the rational basis test.”); see also Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. at 23–24. 
85. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 72. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. ¶ 71.  Compare id. (noting that financial disparity is not sufficient to violate the 
Wisconsin guarantee of a free public education), with Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297–
98 (N.J. 1973) (holding a public school financing system based largely on property taxes 
unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy state constitutional guarantee of a “thorough and 
efficient” free public education). 
88. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 59 (“[T]he constitution does not require districts to have 
uniform revenue-raising capacity.”); see also Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 572, 247 N.W.2d 
141, 151 (1976). 
89. See Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the 
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 994 (1998) (“Although the degree 
of unequal educational opportunities may have been remarkably different in 1973 when 
Rodriguez was decided, today it is clear that many of this nation’s poorest children are 
learning in inadequate educational systems that have failed to teach them the most basic 
subjects.”); Erik LeRoy, Comment, The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the 
Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized, 1981 WIS. 
L. REV. 1325, 1332–33 (1981) (“Rodriguez is a widely criticized decision.”). 
90. Lynch, supra note 89, at 992. 
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“sharply undercut the [majority opinion’s] strength.”91  Moreover, recent 
research on open enrollment in Wisconsin outlined in Part III.C 
suggests that parents have their children transfer schools precisely 
because of “poor standardized test scores, college entrance rates, or the 
like.”92  As the United States Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he inability 
to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic 
education each and every day of his life” and take an “inestimable toll 
of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual, and 
psychological well-being of the individual.”93  Until existing case law is 
revisited, the legislature is best suited to address the disparities by 
crafting legislation that adequately protects the Wisconsin state 
guarantee of a uniform and free public education.94  Unfortunately, the 
expansion of Wisconsin’s inter-district open enrollment program fails to 
provide the necessary protections. 
III. THE NEW (BUT NOT IMPROVED) WISCONSIN OPEN ENROLLMENT 
PROGRAM 
A. Nuts and Bolts: The Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program 
In 2011, the Wisconsin legislature greatly expanded the scope of 
open enrollment by lengthening the regular application window and by 
creating an alternative application procedure that may be used at any 
time during the year.95  Under the prior law, there was a three-week 
timeframe to apply for open enrollment, starting the first Monday in 
February and ending the third Friday following the first Monday in 
February.96  However, the application window was expanded to three 
months under 2011 Wisconsin Act 114, and parents are now eligible to 
apply from the first Monday in February until the last weekday in 
April.97  Additionally, applications may be submitted to a maximum of 
 
91. Id.  
92. See Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 72; see also supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
93. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).  
94. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 510, 436 N.W.2d 568, 585 (1989) (“Such demands 
cannot be remedied by claims of constitutional discrepancies, but rather must be made to the 
legislature and, perhaps, also to the community.”). 
95. See 2011 Wis. Act 114.  
96. Memorandum from Mary Jo Cleaver, Open Enrollment Consultant, to District 
Administrators and Open Enrollment Coordinators (Feb. 2, 2012), available at 
sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/doc/oe_mmo_extended_ap_2012_02_02.doc. 
97. TONY EVERS, INITIAL PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 
114* EXCEPTIONS TO THE PUBLIC SCHOOL OPEN ENROLLMENT APPLICATION PERIOD 8 
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three nonresident school districts during an academic year.98  The 
challenges for school administrators created by this expanded 
application window are detailed below throughout Part III.  
The 2011 amendments also created seven exceptions to the regular 
application period that permit parents to apply for open enrollment at 
any time during the year, if the student falls into one of the enumerated 
categories.99  A parent is now eligible to apply to no more than three 
nonresident schools for open enrollment outside of the application 
window if100: 
1. The resident school board determines that the pupil has been 
the victim of a violent criminal offense, as defined by the 
department by rule.101 
2. The pupil is or has been a homeless pupil in the current or 
immediately preceding school year. . . . 
3. The pupil has been the victim of repeated bullying or 
harassment . . . . 
4. The place of residence of the pupil’s parent or guardian and of 
the pupil has changed as a result of military orders. . . . 
5. The pupil moved into this state. . . . 
6. The place of residence of the pupil has changed as a result of a 
court order or custody agreement or because the pupil was 
placed in a foster home or with a person other than the pupil’s 
parent, or removed from a foster home or from the home of a 
person other than the pupil’s parent. . . . 
7. The parent of the pupil, the resident school board, and the 
nonresident school board agree that attending school in the 
nonresident school district is in the best interests of the pupil.102 
 
(2012) [hereinafter DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES], available at http://www.k12.com/sites/default
/files/pdf/school-docs/OE-FAQ-Act-114.pdf. 
98. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3)(a)(1) (2011–2012). 
99. DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 1–2.  
100. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3m)(a).  
101. If the student has been a victim of a violent crime, the resident district may not 
deny an application due to undue financial burden.  WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, 
FULL-TIME INTER-DISTRICT PUBLIC SCHOOL OPEN ENROLLMENT IN WISCONSIN 76 (2012) 
[hereinafter DPI OPEN ENROLLMENT OVERVIEW 2012–2013], available at sms.dpi.wi.gov/ 
files/sms/ppt/oe_overview_2013-14.ppt. 
102. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3m)(b)(1)–(7) (emphasis added).  
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In evaluating open enrollment applications under the regular and 
alternative application period, a nonresident school district may 
consider space availability,103 whether the student has been expelled 
from any school in the past two years, whether the student is habitually 
truant, and whether a student’s necessary special education services are 
available.104  The 2011 amendment also requires a district to make a 
space availability determination eight months prior to the start of the 
academic year, at the January school board meeting.105  Districts are no 
longer able to consider racial balance as a factor in rejecting or 
approving an application to transfer in or out of a school district 
following a 2007 Attorney General Opinion that Wisconsin Statute 
Section 118.51(7) is unconstitutional.106  Subsequent to the 2007 
Attorney General Opinion, a class action lawsuit—filed by Madison 
students whose applications were denied because departure from the 
school would have increased racial imbalance—led all Wisconsin schools 
to remove race as a factor in the open enrollment application process.107 
Moreover, if the resident school district denies transfer, the parent is 
entitled to appeal the decision to the DPI.108  The resident school district 
must then respond to the DPI and defend the decision to deny the 
student’s transfer.109  If the DPI determines the transfer is in the 
student’s best interest, the decision will be overturned.110  However, 
students may begin attending the nonresident school district before the 
open enrollment application has been approved or denied due to the 
timing of the application and appeals process, which takes an 
 
103. See infra Part III.C for a detailed discussion on space availability determinations. 
104. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(a); see also infra Part III.F for more discussion on special 
education students. 
105. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(a)(1); WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS ABOUT FULL-TIME INTER-DISTRICT PUBLIC SCHOOL OPEN ENROLLMENT 12 
(2012) [hereinafter DPI QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS], available at 
http://dpi.wi.gov/sms/psctoc.html at 12. 
106. Letter from J.B. Van Hollen, Wis. Att’y Gen., to Anthony Evers, Deputy State 
Superintendent, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2007); N.N. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 670 F. Supp. 2d 927, 
931 (W.D. Wis. 2009). 
107. Tony Galli, Madison School District Settles Open Enrollment Lawsuit, 
WKOW.COM (June 1, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://www.wkow.com/story/14823272/madison-school-
district-settles-open-enrollment-lawsuit (noting that the Madison school district ultimately 
settled the case for $90,000); see also N.N., 670 F. Supp. 2d at 931. 
108. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(9); WIS. ADMIN. CODE PI § 36.10(2)(a) (Sept. 2012). 
109. See DPI QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 12. 
110. Id. at 23–24. 
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undetermined amount of time depending on the situation.111  If the 
denial is ultimately upheld by the DPI, the district superintendent must 
then force the student to return to the resident district mid-year.112  
Further, the DPI’s decision may be appealed to the circuit court within 
thirty days of the decision, prolonging the student’s undetermined 
status, and, potentially, attendance at a nonresident district.113 
Other amendments to the Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program 
were made in 2011, such as the ability for a school board to create 
waiting lists as well as minor school aid adjustments.114  However, this 
Comment is limited to those provisions with significant implications for 
Wisconsin families as well as those amendments that pose barriers to the 
effective operations of local school districts, such as the new best 
interest of the pupil standard. 
B. The Best Interest Standard 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that “[t]he history of education 
since the Industrial Revolution shows a continual struggle between two 
forces; the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to provide the 
best education it can afford for its own children.”115  The clash of these 
two forces is aptly demonstrated by the new “best interest” exception to 
Wisconsin’s application period for inter-district open enrollment.  The 
 
111. Id. at 23 (“The length of time it takes to decide an appeal depends on when the 
appeal was received, how long it takes to compile the record of the decision, whether the 
parties file briefs and responses, how many appeals the department receives, and how 
complicated the issues are in the appeal.  Most decisions are made and orders mailed during 
the month of August.”); see also DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 8.  The memo 
noted that: 
Given the timing of the application procedures, it is very possible that students may 
begin attending the nonresident school district before the resident school district has 
acted on the application. 
 . . . If the resident school district denied the application because it does not 
believe the transfer is in the best interests of the student, the student may continue 
to attend the nonresident school district pending the outcome of the appeal. 
Id. 
112. DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 8. 
113. WIS. ADMIN. CODE PI § 36.10(4)(b); WIS. STAT. § 227.53. 
114. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(d)(1); Memorandum from Anne Sappenfield, supra note 16. 
115. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 571, 247 N.W.2d 141, 151 (1976) (quoting James S. 
Coleman, Forward to JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, 
at vii (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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first six exceptions to the open enrollment application period provide 
specific circumstances that are not likely to be the cause of substantial 
controversy.116  In fact, some of the exceptions are quite practical (i.e., 
for students who move into the state117) and other exceptions may be 
useful to give students a fresh start at a new school system, particularly 
in the case of students that are bullied or harassed.118  However, the 
seventh exception provides a vague and undefined option for district 
transfer when the parent(s), the resident district superintendent, and the 
nonresident district superintendent agree that the transfer is in the “best 
interests of the pupil.”119 
The legislature failed to define standards by which the “best interests 
of the pupil” is to be measured and, consequently, the exception 
effectively permits year-round open enrollment at the discretion of 
individual families, assuming the parent complies with the application 
procedures and there is space available.120  Initially, the DPI provided a 
cyclical and unhelpful definition, noting that, “[a] transfer is in the best 
interests of the student if the parent and nonresident school district 
agree and the resident school district does not disagree that the transfer 
is in the student’s best interest.”121  A more recent publication from the 
DPI notes that when reviewing the best interest exception, the initial 
assumption is that the “[p]arent is [the] best judge of the pupil’s 
interests.”122  Additionally, “[a] nonresident or resident school district 
may only deny if the district has sufficient reason to overcome the 
parent’s judgment” that the transfer is not in the student’s best 
interest.123  However, most superintendents expected to make a best 
interest determination have never even met the student, much less are 
able to adequately address the considerations necessary to deem a 
certain placement in the best interest of a student.124 
 
116. See WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3m). 
117. Id. § 118.51(3m)(b)(5). 
118. Id. § 118.51(3m)(b)(3). 
119. Id. § 118.51(3m)(b)(7). 
120. See DPI OPEN ENROLLMENT OVERVIEW 2012–2013, supra note 101, at 75. 
121. DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 11. 
122. DPI OPEN ENROLLMENT OVERVIEW 2012–2013, supra note 101, at 75. 
123. Id. 
124. Even in a small town, such as Plymouth, Wisconsin, with a total population of 
roughly 8,000, Superintendent Clark Reinke indicated that he and his colleagues are not sure 
how to make best interest determinations when they have never personally met the students.  
Telephone interview with Dr. Clark Reinke, Former Superintendent, Plymouth School 
District (Oct. 22, 2012). 
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As a result, if a child does not meet the first six exceptions, there is 
no guidance on what may be factored into the best interest 
consideration.  Perhaps standards will be developed through a case-by-
case analysis during the appeal process, or administrative rules will be 
promulgated.125  However, the DPI is currently left with few options but 
to defer to the parent’s judgment, which may not always be forthcoming.  
For example, the Nebraska legislature recently removed a requirement 
for parents to include in the application the reason for the student’s 
desire to transfer to another district after “the realization that parents 
are not always truthful about” the reasons for district transfer.126  
Without sufficiently defined standards, it is likely that extracurricular 
activities, parent dissatisfaction, and general convenience will continue 
to play a significant role in parents’ determinations of the best interests 
of their children.127 
For now, the vague and undefined best interest standard within the 
context of public education appears ripe for litigation.128  Similar to the 
lawsuit filed by disgruntled students denied transfer based on a statutory 
provision regarding racial balance, it is only a matter of time before 
students denied transfer under the best interest exception also appeal 
the decision to the courts.129  Yet the exception establishes a seemingly 
impossible standard for the district to rebut, despite financial and 
 
125. See DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 12.  In the initial memo relating to 
the 2011 amendments, the DPI noted: 
 DPI will review the facts and arguments submitted by the parents and the 
resident school district and make a decision about whether the transfer is in the best 
interests of the student. 
 The DPI will not consider any factors that are not related to the best interests 
of the student.  That is, DPI will not consider the financial effect on the resident 
school district or any other factors, except as they relate to the best interests of the 
student. 
 The DPI’s decision is final. 
Id. 
126. Smith, supra note 20, at 278 (noting reasons that parents do not disclose 
motivations behind relocation, such as racial motivations). 
127. See supra Part II.C (discussing reasons why parents choose particular school 
districts, including higher test scores and extracurricular activities). 
128. The author is unaware of any filed or pending lawsuits to date.  See infra note 232 
and accompanying text. 
129. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the 2007 class action lawsuit 
based on the denial of open enrollment transfer applications). 
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logistical impediments to local control.130  Moreover, the “amorphous” 
nature of the best interest standard places a judge in the difficult 
situation to provide substance to the fluid, “inherently arbitrary,” and 
indeterminate standard when decisions are inevitably appealed to the 
circuit courts.131  Until greater clarity is provided, the decision appears to 
rest largely in the hands of dissatisfied parents.132 
C. Space Availability Determinations 
Another challenge enhanced by the 2011 amendments relates to the 
school district’s requirement to make a space availability determination.  
Under Wisconsin law, school boards are only required to accept 
nonresident students if there is space available, in addition to a few 
other considerations.133  However, in light of the dramatic expansion of 
the Wisconsin’s Open Enrollment Program, a space availability 
determination is now required in January of each year, a full eight 
months prior to the start of the following academic year.134  Concerns 
and questions among school districts are widespread.  How can a district 
effectively plan eight months in advance when students can leave at any 
time throughout the year?135  Also, what happens if the January 
projections are wrong?136  The DPI indicates that if a nonresident school 
district accepts a student and later discovers a lack of space availability, 
the district cannot rescind the offer.137  Thus, the DPI gives significant 
consideration to the newly required January projections.138  The DPI 
grants a narrow exception to districts for students with an individualized 
 
130. See infra Part III.C–D. 
131. See Lynn M. Akre, Comment, Struggling with Indeterminacy: A Call for 
Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Redefining the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard, 75 
MARQ. L. REV. 628, 670–71 (1992) (“It is the judges who are the most deeply enmeshed in 
the problem who carry the heaviest responsibility on their shoulders and are forced to 
continually struggle to find meaning in the amorphous ‘best interest of the child’ standard.”). 
132. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV (providing 
recommendations to repeal the best interest exception, or, alternatively, to provide standards 
by which to evaluate a best interest determination).  
133. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(a)(1) (2011–2012); see also supra note 103 and 
accompanying text. 
134. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
135. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
136. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
137. DPI QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 13 (“Once a student is 
approved for open enrollment, that student must be permitted to open enroll.”). 
138. See id. at 12. 
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education program (IEP)139 that is created or altered after the student 
enrolls in the nonresident district.140 
The school district is permitted to take into consideration several 
factors in determining space availability, including class size limits, 
student-teacher ratios, and enrollment projections.141  However, the 
space determination cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable and the district 
must be able to provide a reasonable justification for an applicant’s 
denial based on space availability.142  In McMorrow v. Benson, the 
Whitefish Bay School District denied the plaintiff’s application for open 
enrollment for lack of space availability but accepted the applications of 
three continuing students that were already enrolled in the school.143  
The circuit court held that the decision to accept continuing students 
despite an expressed concern for space availability was arbitrary.144  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court and found that the continuing 
student provision that permits nonresident districts to guarantee 
approval to currently attending students “applies only when there are 
spaces available in the first place.”145  However, “when there are more 
applicants than spaces available, the pupils accepted shall be determined 
on a random basis” even if certain students are currently attending the 
district.146 
In light of the 2011 amendments to open enrollment, it is possible 
that the circuit court decision would come out differently because the 
decision operated against the best interest of the continuing students, 
who were required to transfer districts in the middle of the academic 
year.  Thus, school districts must now re-evaluate the little Wisconsin 
case law that provides substantive guidance on space availability 
determinations, while making difficult projections in the midst of year-
round open enrollment transfers. 
 
139. An Individualized Education Program (IEP) is a written statement for each child 
with a disability that includes a statement of the child’s present level of academic 
achievement, measurable annual goals, a description of the child’s progress toward meeting 
the goals, as well as other federal requirements.  34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (2012). 
140. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(12)(a) (2011–2012). 
141. McMorrow v. Benson, 2000 WI App 173, ¶ 13, 238 Wis. 2d 329, 617 N.W.2d 247 
(citing WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(a)). 
142. Id. ¶ 10. 
143. Id. ¶ 11. 
144. Id. ¶ 6. 
145. Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis omitted). 
146. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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D. Financial Implications 
In addition to logistical considerations such as the space availability 
determination, the expansion of open enrollment impacts local district 
finances.  Although public school financing is not explicitly addressed by 
the open enrollment amendments, the loss of students significantly 
impacts a school district’s budget through the loss of per-pupil funding.147  
The districts that lose a substantial number of students through open 
enrollment transfers “have fewer dollars to spend on the students 
remaining, and the operation of those districts will become less uniform, 
thorough, and efficient.”148  Districts suffering from the sustained loss of 
financial resources are then forced to eliminate many attractive aspects 
of a well-rounded public school, such as physical education, art, music, 
journalism, advanced placement courses, and field trips.149  Thus, the 
financial implications of the recent amendments impact all families with 
students in the public school system, especially those that remain in the 
“losing” districts that enter into a “downward and accelerating ‘spiral of 
decline.’”150 
Under the Wisconsin’s Open Enrollment Program, families do not 
pay for the cost of attending a nonresident district.151  Rather, the DPI 
transfers aid from the resident to the nonresident school on a prorated 
basis,152 although an exception exists for special education students.153  
The amount transferred per student is “equal to the statewide average 
per pupil school district cost for regular instruction, co-curricular 
activities, instructional support services and pupil support services in the 
 
147. School districts derive most of their revenue through state aid—which is based on 
the districts per pupil value of taxable property—and local property taxes.  RUSS KAVA & 
LAYLA MERRIFIELD, WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, STATE AID TO SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS 1, 3 (2013), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/Informational-
Papers/Documents/2013/24_State%20Aid%20to%20School%20Districts.pdf (noting that in 
2010–2011 over 87% of district revenue came from state aid and property taxes); see also WIS. 
STAT. § 118.51(16) (2011–2012). 
148. McGillivray, supra note 32, at 129. 
149. Jimerson, supra note 15, at 18. 
150. Id. (quoting Kenneth Howe et al., School Choice Crucible: A Case Study of Boulder 
Valley, 83 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 137, 144 (2001)). 
151. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(16); see also LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN 
ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 4. 
152. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(16)(c); see also LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN 
ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 7. 
153. The resident school district pays the nonresident district directly for a special 
education student.  See WIS. STAT. § 118.51(17); Doe v. Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, No. 
03-CV-892, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 2004). 
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previous school year.”154  By looking to aggregate state data, proponents 
of open enrollment minimize the financial impacts.155  At the statewide 
level, only 4.4% of the student population in Wisconsin participated in 
open enrollment in the 2011–2012 academic year.156  However, a 
microlevel analysis at the district level indicates that over 50% of 
Wisconsin school districts suffered a net loss of students, which includes 
a loss in state aid.157  For the 2011–2012 academic year, the total amount 
transferred per student using open enrollment was $6,867,158 and out of 
424 districts, 224 had a net loss of students and 199 had a net gain in the 
2010–2011 academic year.159 
A 2011 legislative audit report on open enrollment indicates that 
those districts with a net gain of students had higher property taxes than 
those districts with a net loss.160  As a result, the transfer of students 
through open enrollment disproportionally impacts districts with lower 
property taxes by taking roughly $7,000 for each student out of the 
district without regard to certain fixed costs.161  Although a percentage 
cap on transfers out of a resident school district was initially authorized, 
the law no longer permits a denial of an open enrollment application 
under the percentage cap or based on an undue financial burden, as it 
did prior to and during the 2005–2006 academic year.162  Therefore, a 
resident district cannot deny a student the opportunity to transfer to a 
nonresident district solely because of the financial burden imposed by 
the aggregate loss of students to neighboring districts.163  Moreover, 
 
154. DPI QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 30; see also WIS. STAT. 
§ 118.51(16)(a). 
155. Jimerson, supra note 15, at 18. 
156. RUSS KAVA, WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, OPEN ENROLLMENT 
PROGRAM: INFORMATIONAL PAPER 27, at 10 (2013), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lf
b/publications/Informational-Papers/Documents/2013/27_Open%20Enrollment%20Program. 
pdf. 
157. Id. at app. 15–24; LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN ENROLLMENT, supra 
note 11, at 4. 
158. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, OPEN ENROLLMENT AT A GLANCE: 
STATEWIDE DATA (2012), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/oe_psoe_at_a_glanc
e.pdf; see also WIS. STAT. § 118.51(16)(a). 
159. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 7. 
160. Id.  The receiving districts tend to be smaller, have higher direct educational costs 
per student, and receive less equalization aid.  Id. 
161. Id. at 6–7. 
162. Sch. Dist. of Stockbridge v. Evers, 2010 WI App 144, ¶ 1, 330 Wis. 2d 80, 792 
N.W.2d 615 (interpreting WIS. STAT. § 118.51(6) (2007–08)). 
163. See id. 
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districts are not permitted to increase property taxes to offset any loss of 
state aid resulting from open enrollment transfers and are without 
recourse to compensate for the lost funding.164 
In fact, the extended application period has created “a budgeting 
nightmare for districts working on financial forecasts” for the upcoming 
year.165  During the same period where students apply for open 
enrollment transfers, school districts are required to make space 
availability determinations, set budgets, estimate enrollment, and 
anticipate staff needs for the following school year.166  In Racine, district 
leaders attempted to plan for the 2011–2012 school year with an 
anticipated $4.35 million revenue loss resulting from open enrollment.167  
Similarly, open enrollment created “more losers than winners” in 
Kenosha County where only five of the twelve public school districts 
gained more students than it lost in the 2010–2012 school years.168  
School administrator David Milz noted that for the Salem school 
system, open enrollment “represent[s] a huge financial loss of nearly $1 
million from [the] budget, money that cannot be recovered.”169  For the 
 
164. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 5. 
165. Dorothy Jasperson-Robson, Open Enrollment Extension Presents Budgeting Delays 
for School Districts, WESTBY TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://lacrossetribune.com/west
bytimes/news/local/open-enrollment-extension-presents-budgeting-delays-for-school-distri 
cts/article_b6692c12-57f3-11e1-aac0-0019bb2963f4.html; Morgan Smith, Weighing Options for 
Expanding School Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2012, at A27A. 
166. Jasperson-Robson, supra note 165.  The Westby Times reported:  
Charles Norton, the Westby Area School District Administrator, said each year as 
school districts prepare the budget for the upcoming school year, the first and most 
challenging decision made is to forecast the number of students enrolled by 
building/grade and the overall district, and those numbers are used to estimate the 
potential level of state aid, as well as class sizes and the number of staff required to 
fill their educational needs.   
 “Without this key piece of the puzzle, the process simply cannot begin in 
earnest.  Pushing the open enrollment deadline back to April 30 will certainly have 
an impact on our ability to forecast final student counts thereby making it even 
more difficult to finalize a budget and the related staff counts required to meet 
student need,” Norton said. 
Id.  
167. Melinda Tichelaar, Racine Unified School District Budget Impacted by Declining 
Enrollment, CALEDONIA PATCH (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://caledonia.patch.com/articles
/racine-unified-school-district-budget-impacted-by-declining-enrollment.  
168. Jill Tatge-Rozell, County Schools Raked by Open Enrollment: Only Five of 12 
Local Districts Gaining Students; Millions in Aid Changing Hands, KENOSHA NEWS (Feb. 7, 
2011, 1:16 AM) (on file with author). 
169. Id. 
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districts that receive more students than they lose, the open enrollment 
program is considered a means to combat budget shortfalls, but in the 
end it serves to only intensify the already stark wealth disparity between 
school districts.170 
The financial implications of open enrollment are not unique to 
Wisconsin.  In fact, Ohio,171 Minnesota,172 and Texas173 also report that 
open enrollment poses significant constraints to district funding.174  In 
Ohio, the financial implications are even greater when a district opts not 
to participate in open enrollment because even though a district can 
choose to not accept incoming transfer students, it cannot refuse to 
permit resident students to transfer out.175  Although a full discussion of 
school finance litigation is beyond the scope of this Comment, public 
school finances impact all students and families, particularly those in the 
50% of districts with dwindling state funding each year.176  The fiscal 
uncertainty experienced by these districts is only compounded by the 
year-round statutory exceptions to the open enrollment application 
period, which also provides a new pool of potential students to funnel 
toward virtual charter schools. 
 
170. In Wauwatosa, the district intended to “patch an anticipated $1.6 million budget 
shortfall” by admitting an additional 270 open enrollment students in the 2009–2010 academic 
year.  See More Open Enrollment Students Could Solve District’s Budget Gap, WAUWATOSA 
NOW (May 28, 2009), http://www.wauwatosanow.com/news/46360947.html. 
171. Richard Jones, Open Enrollment Hurts Some Schools in Funding, OXFORD PRESS 
(Oxford, Ohio) (Jan. 6, 2012, 10:35 PM), http://www.oxfordpress.com/news/news/local/open-
enrollment-hurts-some-schools-in-funding/nNYd6/ (noting that although some schools recoup 
a significant portion of lost funds through incoming student transfers, others fall far short; for 
example, the Middletown school system lost more than $1.8 million in funding but only 
gained a little over $323,000 through new students enrolled in the district); see also Open 
Enrollment Helps, Hurts School Districts, STAR BEACON (Ashtabula, Ohio) (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://starbeacon.com/local/x553406727/Open-enrollment-helps-hurts-school-districts (noting 
that the open enrollment program “play[s] havoc with the per-pupil funding that follows each 
child”). 
172. Mascia, supra note 49, at 462–63 & n.241 (citing Interview with Willard K. Baker, 
Executive Director, Minnesota School Board, in Connie Leslie et al., Giving Parents a 
Choice, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1988, at 78). 
173. Morgan Smith, Some Texas Districts Pursuing School Choice Locally, TEXAS 
TRIBUNE (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.texastribune.org/2012/12/14/some-texas-districts-
pursuing-school-choice-locall/ (quoting Michael Zolkosi, Ysleta Independent School District 
Superintendent, who noted that open enrollment “hurts districts in the planning for facilities, 
salaries for teachers, [and] building locations for students” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
174. Mascia, supra note 49, at 463–64. 
175. See Open Enrollment Helps, Hurts School Districts, supra note 171.  
176. See LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 7. 
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E. The Rise of Virtual Charter Schools in Wisconsin 
Another factor accelerating the loss of financial support from public 
schools in Wisconsin is the rise of the for-profit virtual education 
industry, which was a key lobbying force behind the 2011 amendments 
and has since significantly benefitted.177  Virtual charter schools are 
publicly funded schools that operate independently of many state 
regulations applied to traditional public schools yet are eligible for the 
same state aid per pupil.178  Students attend school from home and 
communicate with teachers virtually, largely through online forums.179  
While the tremendous increase in students opting out of their resident 
district seems to support the argument to do away with the residential-
based education model, the Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of 
state residency requirements in Martinez v. Bynum.180  Nonetheless, 
residency requirements are increasingly challenged as antiquated and 
irrelevant in the twenty-first century due to increased global mobility 
and the proliferation of virtual charter schools.181  Although the 
residential-based public education system is alive and well today, the 
expansion of the open enrollment program as well as the removal of a 
virtual school enrollment cap has paved the way for the continued 
expansion of virtual schools.182 
Interestingly, the virtual education industry in Wisconsin was one of 
the primary lobbyists behind the 2011 legislative expansion of open 
 
177. Eric Oliver, Half of Virtual Charter Schools Judged in New Report Cards Miss 
Mark, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 2013, at 9A. 
178. PAUL STUIBER ET AL., WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, AN EVALUATION: 
VIRTUAL CHARTER SCHOOLS 3–4 (2010), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/ 
10-3full.pdf; Oliver, supra note 177 (“Like other charter schools, virtual charter schools are 
eligible for $7,775 annually in state aid per pupil.”). 
179. STUIBER ET AL., supra note 178, at 19–20. 
180. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1983).  Bona fide residency 
requirements—as opposed to durational residency requirements that condition a benefit on a 
minimum period of residence within a particular jurisdiction—are generally upheld as they 
further a substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are 
enjoyed by its residents.  Id. at 325. 
181. See Sarah L. Browning, Will Residency Be Relevant to Public Education in the 
Twenty-First Century?, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 297, 338–44 (2010).  
182. See Eric Litke, Virtual School Enrollment Jumps 38 Percent, SHEBOYGAN PRESS 
(Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.sheboyganpress.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/201210191636/S
HE019802/310190372; see also Erin Richards & Jennifer Zahn, Many Districts Losing 
Students: But Some Online Charter Schools Report Hefty Gains, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
October 15, 2012, at 1A. 
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enrollment in Wisconsin.183  According to the Wisconsin Government 
Accountability Board, virtual education organizations—including K12 
Inc., Insight Schools, and the Wisconsin Coalition of Virtual School 
Families—spent a significant amount of time and resources advocating 
on behalf of the open enrollment amendments.184  During the Senate 
Committee on Education hearings on Senate Bill 2, the Wisconsin 
Coalition for Virtual School Families gave the only public testimony in 
support of the proposed legislation, aside from the DPI and the 
Wisconsin Association of School Boards.185  Significantly, K12 Inc., 
which is headquartered in Virginia but operates in Wisconsin and 
nationwide, spent nearly $26.5 million on advertising in 2010 yet only 
one third of its students achieved Adequate Yearly Progress, a threshold 
measurement defined by the No Child Left Behind Act to assess 
students’ progress on standardized tests.186 
Wisconsin State Superintendent, Tony Evers, and the former chair 
of the Senate Committee on Education and Corrections, John Lehman, 
have both expressed distaste with this consequence of the expansion of 
open enrollment.187  Superintendent Evers recently commented that, 
“[o]ne of the concerns I do have is that the virtual school law is 
relatively permissive, and we have some schools popping up around the 
state that frankly look more like resource centers for home school kids 
than they do schools.”188  Further, Senator John Lehman noted 
discomfort with the state assuming financial responsibility for home 
school families using virtual education programs.189  The DPI has little 
 
183. See Eye on Lobbying: Senate Bill 2, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD, 
https://lobbying.wi.gov/What/BillInformation/2011REG/Information/7918 (last visited Dec. 
28, 2013); see also Memorandum from Rose Fernandez, Wisconsin Coalition of Virtual 
School Families, to Assembly Republicans (Apr. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.wivirtualschoolfamilies.org/alerts/memo-on-sb2/. 
184. See Eye on Lobbying: Senate Bill 2, supra note 183. 
185. Senate Committee on Education Public Hearing, WISCONSINEYE at 16:40–38:35 
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?evhdid
=3582.  Representatives from the Wisconsin Coalition of Virtual School Families testified that 
the proposed expansion of open enrollment was necessary, but not sufficient, and that the bill 
is only the beginning of an effort to erode the traditional, residentially based public school 
system.  Id. 
186. Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 2011, at A1; No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1111(b)(2), 115 Stat. 1445–
46 (2001) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2012)). 
187. Litke, supra note 182.  
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
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oversight over virtual schools, online students are exempt from daily 
attendance laws, and the DPI does not track daily attendance or have an 
alternative system in place to ensure regular attendance.190 
Although the DPI recently announced plans for an in-depth study of 
virtual schools during the 2012–2013 school year,191 no study was planned 
until a media investigation revealed “significant achievement gaps 
between students” attending virtual charter schools and those attending 
traditional public schools.192  The investigation reported that students in 
virtual schools “struggle to finish high school in four years, repeat grades 
five times as frequently and last year trailed their counterparts in every 
subject but reading on the annual Wisconsin Student Assessment 
System test.”193  As one Wisconsin superintendent argued in a brief to 
the DPI supporting the denial of a student’s transfer request, “[w]ith 39 
years of experience as a professional educator, a doctorate degree in 
education, [and] 13 years as Superintendent of the Plymouth School 
District . . . .  I cannot in good conscience agree that enrollment in a 
virtual school is in the best educational interests of this student.”194  The 
most recent report card issued by the DPI found that half of the virtual 
schools assessed did not meet state performance expectations.195 
Not only have the schools failed to perform academically, but the 
rise of virtual education has also negatively impacted public school 
finances.  A 2010 legislative audit recognized that school districts suffer 
a financial loss when students not previously enrolled in the district 
attend virtual schools through open enrollment because few schools lose 
enough students to reduce fixed costs.196  Although the drafting record 
for 2011 Wisconsin Act 114 indicated no projected change in the state 
budget, an impact in the local budget was predicted if students who are 
currently home schooled chose to attend a nonresident school district by 
 
190. Eric Litke, DPI Planning “In-Depth” Study of Virtual Schools, SHEBOYGAN 
PRESS (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.sheboyganpress.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/201210181
312/SHE019802/310180373 [hereinafter DPI Planning “In-Depth” Study of Virtual Schools]; 
see also STUIBER ET AL., supra note 178, at 19–21. 
191. DPI Planning “In-Depth” Study of Virtual Schools, supra note 190.  
Recommendations for this study were made by the state’s nonpartisan Legislative Audit 
Bureau in a report issued in February 2010.  See STUIBER ET AL., supra note 178, at 7. 
192. DPI Planning “In-Depth” Study of Virtual Schools, supra note 190. 
193. Id. 
194. See Letter from Clark Reinke, Superintendent, to Jennifer Danfield, Open 
Enrollment Consultant (Sept. 6, 2012) (on file with author). 
195. Oliver, supra note 177. 
196. Id. 
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using open enrollment.197  In a very short time, that prediction has come 
true.  Home-school students are now enrolling in virtual schools, at the 
taxpayer’s expense, when they never attended the public school and the 
district did not initially receive funding for the student.198 
One school administrator at a virtual school in Merril, Wisconsin 
noted that about 80% of the school’s 460 students are former home-
school students who were never enrolled in the public school system.199  
These school districts not only lose expected funding from their 
projected budget when existing students leave, but they also have to 
account for unexpected funds when a previously home-schooled student 
now wants to attend a virtual school.200  In an effort to mitigate this 
challenge, administrative regulations require an applicant to register in 
the resident district prior to beginning open enrollment.201  However, 
increasing use of the best interest standard ensures that students will be 
transferring throughout the year, leaving district budgets in constant 
fluctuation.202  Assuming financial responsibility for Wisconsin students 
to attend these “relatively permissive . . . resource centers” that have 
failed to meet minimum performance expectations does not appear to 
serve the best interest of Wisconsin students and families.203 
F. Students with Disabilities: The Undue Financial Burden Standard 
While open enrollment is increasingly accessible to the majority of 
the population, students with disabilities face additional hurdles and are 
 
197. See DONALD SMITH, WIS. DEP’T OF ADMIN., FISCAL ESTIMATE-2011 SESSION 2 
(2011), available at http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/fe/sb2/sb2_DPI.pdf. 
198. Litke, supra note 182.  The same is true with recent expansion of the private school 
choice program in Racine and various other cities in Wisconsin.  Erin Richards & Patrick 
Simonaitis, Most Students Applying for State Voucher Program Attend Private Schools, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/most-
students-applying-for-state-voucher-program-attend-private-schools-b9976473z1-219789131.h 
tml.  In fact, 67% of students who participated in the new and limited Wisconsin state 
voucher program “were already attending a private school last year without the help of 
taxpayer dollars.”  Id. 
199. Litke, supra note 182. 
200. In addition, public schools are unable to compete with the marketing funds 
available to the for-profit virtual school programs.  Id. 
201. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE § PI 36.03(1)(f), (3)(d) (Sept. 2012). 
202. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text (discussing the financial and 
budgeting “nightmare” caused by the open enrollment amendments). 
203. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.  
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more likely to be denied participation than non-disabled students.204  
During the 2012–2013 academic year, special education student 
applications were denied roughly 42% of the time, as opposed to a 32% 
denial rate for general education students.205 
Open enrollment costs for students with disabilities are paid by the 
resident school district directly to the nonresident district, unlike 
students without disabilities where the DPI transfers funds directly.206  
The nonresident school district bills the standard transfer amount for 
regular education students plus any “actual, additional, special 
education costs” incurred in educating the student.207  Because 
nonresident school districts do not shoulder the cost of educating 
transfer students with disabilities, the nonresident school district can 
only deny enrollment for lack of space availability or if the services 
required by the IEP are not available.208  The nonresident school district 
is not permitted to deny a student with an IEP based on financial 
considerations.209  However, resident school districts are permitted to 
deny an open enrollment request for a student with an IEP if the cost of 
the special education imposes an “undue financial burden,” which takes 
into consideration the school district’s total economic circumstances.210 
 
204. See WIS. DEP’T OF INSTRUCTION, OPEN ENROLLMENT APPROVALS AND 
DENIALS: SPECIAL EDUCATION AND NOT SPECIAL EDUCATION (2012), available at 
http://oe.dpi.wi.gov/files/oe/pdf/multi-yr-sped-participation-data.pdf; Emily Kram, Disabilities 
Create Hurdles to Open Enrollment, SUPERIOR TELEGRAM (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://www.superiortelegram.com/content/disabilities-create-hurdles-open-enrollment. 
205. WIS. DEP’T OF INSTRUCTION, supra note 204. 
206. See Doe v. Wis. Dep’t. of Pub. Instruction, No. 03-CV-892, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Wis. 
Dec. 2004).  
207. Id.  “Actual, additional special education costs” are those costs actually incurred by 
the school district that are specific to the student and would not be incurred if the student 
were not attending the nonresident school district.  Id. 
208. WIS. STAT. §§ 118.13(1), 118.51(5)(a)(4) (2011–2012). 
209. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(12)(a)–(b), (17); see also Doe, No. 03-CV-892, slip op. at 2 
(holding unconstitutional a prior version of the open enrollment statute that permitted open 
enrollment tuition for disabled students to exceed tuition for non-disabled students). 
210. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(12)(b)(1); Sch. Dist. of Stockbridge v. Evers, 2010 WI App 144, 
¶ 11, 330 Wis. 2d 80, 792 N.W.2d 615 (holding that a resident school district is permitted to 
deny a transfer application to a nonresident school district based on the costs to implement a 
student’s IEP).  An “undue financial burden” is determined “in light of the resident school 
district’s total economic circumstances, including its revenue limit . . . , its ability to pay tuition 
costs for the pupil, and the per pupil special education or related services costs for children 
with disabilities continuing to be served by the resident school district.”  WIS. STAT. 
§ 118.51(12)(b)(1). 
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The DPI recently shed some light on the “undue financial burden” 
standard by overturning the Rice Lake School Board’s denial of an open 
enrollment transfer for a disabled student in 2010.211  Since 2009, the 
Rice Lake School District had reduced its operating budget by over 
$680,000 due to declining enrollment largely attributed to open 
enrollment.212  In order to accommodate the transfer request for a 
student with exceptional needs, the resident district (Rice Lake) was 
required to fund a duplicate program already running with a cost of 
roughly $80,000 for occupational and physical therapy costs as well as 
special education and related services.213  Even though the resident 
district already had a program to serve the student’s needs, the DPI held 
that “the statute does not permit a district to deny because the tuition 
cost is a financial burden; the financial burden must be ‘undue.’”214 
Despite this recent decision, the contours of what constitutes an 
undue financial burden remain relatively unclear.215  Nonetheless, 
disabled students may be denied transfer to a nonresident school district 
based on an undue financial burden while their non-disabled 
counterparts may not.216  Although such regulation is likely due to 
competing public policy concerns, the end result leaves school districts 
in a fiscal nightmare while depriving disabled students of equal access to 
participate in open enrollment. 
G. Other Equitable Concerns 
In addition to the disparate treatment for disabled students and 
financial disparities between school districts, open enrollment raises 
other equitable concerns that primarily face low-income families and 
students.  Traditionally, equitable arguments center on the barriers for 
low-income families that do not have the ability to transport their 
 




214. Id. (quoting the DPI decision regarding the Rice Lake transfer denial). 
215. In addition, the financial burden on the resident school district is compounded by 
the responsibility to provide transportation for students with IEPs that require transportation.  
See WIS. STAT. § 118.51(14)(a)(2).  In contrast, parents are responsible for transportation to 
the nonresident school for non-disabled students.  See id. § 118.51(14)(a)(1). 
216. See id. § 118.51(12)(b)(1). 
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children to a neighboring district or cannot afford transportation costs.217  
However, Wisconsin has attempted to mitigate this disparity by 
providing transportation assistance for low-income parents who are 
eligible for free or reduced meals under federal guidelines.218 
Instead, the equitable implications that stem from the recent 
amendments to the open enrollment program relate to a lack of 
information or misinformation.  Low-income and less educated families 
tend to have less access to information relating to the quality of school 
systems.219  For example, the 2014–2015 DPI Open Enrollment Brochure 
states that “[t]he application period closes at 4:00 p.m. on April 30, 2014.  
Late applications will not be accepted for any reason.”220  One Wisconsin 
news article reported that the application deadlines from February 
through April are “firm” and that “early and late applications are not 
accepted.”221  For a parent who is not “in the know,” the emphasized 
language that “[l]ate applications will not be accepted for any reason” 
seems pretty clear.  Unless the parent has sufficient information relating 
to the alternative application period, the quoted language above would 
likely be the last stop for many Wisconsin parents. 
Additionally, studies of the open enrollment programs in Akron, 
Omaha, and Des Moines indicated a “glaring underutilization” by 
nonwhite students and “a disproportionate number of white students 
transferring out of the urban district[s].”222  An Iowa Board of Education 
report concluded that nonwhite students did not have sufficient 
information about the open enrollment program but would participate if 
such information was provided.223  In addition, studies indicate that 
 
217. See McGillivray, supra note 32, at 120 (“Transportation issues have led to law suits 
in other states where low income students have been denied the right to attend a school of 
choice because they lacked affordable transportation.  When adequate transportation is not 
provided, open enrollment merely becomes another program which disadvantaged pupils may 
not use.”). 
218. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(14)(b). 
219. Smith, supra note 20, at 279 (quoting Richard W. Campbell & Lawrence R. 
Hepburn, Educational Choice: Is It Really a “Panacea” for What Ails American Schools?, 2 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 70 (1992)); see also VAN DUNK & DICKMAN, supra note 42, at 97 
(noting that shopping for schools is not an easy task). 
220. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, FULL-TIME INTER-DISTRICT OPEN ENROLL- 
MENT IN WISCONSIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/OE%
20brochure%202014-15.pdf. 
221. Jasperson-Robson, supra note 165. 
222. Constance Hawke, The “Choice” For Urban School Districts: Open Enrollment or 
Desegregation?, 115 ED. LAW REP. 609, 620 (1997). 
223. Id. at 619–20. 
MALUGADE FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:23 PM 
2014] OPEN ENROLLMENT 847 
“minority parents and parents of lower socioeconomic status have fewer 
interactions with individuals who have knowledge about schools” and as 
a result have less information by which to make a decision.224  Thus, 
appropriate implementation of an open enrollment program requires 
greater efforts to provide sufficient information to parents and students 
of disadvantaged backgrounds in order to level the playing field.225 
IV. CURTAILING THE EXPANSION OF OPEN ENROLLMENT BEST 
SERVES ALL WISCONSIN STUDENTS 
Although this Comment does not advocate the elimination of open 
enrollment entirely, it suggests that the recent and continued expansion 
of the program undermines the effectiveness of over half of the state 
public school districts that suffer from the infusion of the free market 
into Wisconsin public education.226  Unless the expansion of open 
enrollment is reined in with sufficient parameters, it will continue to 
grow and further compromise the education of those students who 
remain in the losing districts.227  Instead, a return to the limited, three-
week application period allows districts sufficient time to plan while 
providing parents with an opportunity to participate in the open 
enrollment program, as has been the case since its inception in 1998.  
Additionally, the legislature should closely evaluate how the expanded 
open enrollment application period facilitates the rise of virtual 
education and implement strict regulations to ensure performance 
expectations are satisfied by virtual schools.  The significant 
achievement gaps between virtual schools and traditional public schools 
as well as the overall lack of regulation indicates that the proliferating 
 
224. VAN DUNK & DICKMAN, supra note 42, at 97–98 (citing MARK SCHNEIDER ET AL., 
CHOOSING SCHOOLS: CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 149 
(2000); Jeffrey R. Henig, The Local Dynamics of Choice: Ethnic Preferences and Institutional 
Responses, in WHO CHOSES? WHO LOSES? CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL 
EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 95, 110 (Bruce Fuller et al. eds., 1996)). 
225. Hawke, supra note 222, at 620 (noting “school districts implementing open 
enrollment should consider making dissemination of information about open enrollment 
options to parents and students a top priority, with the hopes of generating as much interest 
as possible in both the white and nonwhite sector”). 
226. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text (noting that 50% of Wisconsin 
public school districts lost students and financial support in the 2010–2011 academic year as a 
result of open enrollment). 
227. See supra note 185 (highlighting that proponents of the 2011 legislative 
amendments consider the expansion as “only the beginning”). 
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virtual education industry is not currently in the best interest of 
Wisconsin students and families.228 
Moreover, the Wisconsin legislature should repeal the statutory best 
interest exception to the open enrollment application period in light of 
the limited benefit and the significant impediment to local control it 
provides.  Similar to the best interest of the child standard that has long 
been applied in the context of family law,229 the recent inclusion of the 
best interest of the pupil standard introduces ambiguity and uncertainty 
into the realm of public education.230  Historically, the best interest 
standard has received significant criticism with many arguing that “it is 
too indeterminate to be helpful in legal decisions.”231  Also, the best 
interest standard is sure to increase litigation surrounding open 
enrollment transfers, just as it has done in family law disputes.232  
Instead, if one of the first six categories that permit an exception to the 
application period do not apply, it is reasonable to require the student to 
wait until the application period opens for the subsequent year, 
particularly in light of the administrative, financial, and logistical 
concerns that directly impact the overall efficiency of the public school 
system.233  These six exceptions provide greater certainty for all parties 
and relatively objective standards to guide student transfer decisions 
with minor conflict.234   
 
228. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
229. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 43 
(2006) (“The ‘best interests of the child’ standard expresses the state’s parens patriae role and 
has been widely adopted by state legislatures to guide judges making custodial and other 
decisions related to children.”). 
230. In contrast, proponents of the best interest standard in other fields of the law see 
the standard as providing flexibility and adaptability.  Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the 
Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law 
Institute’s “Approximation Rule,” 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 83, 98 (2011). 
231. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care—In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. 
EDUC. REV. 599, 599 (1973); Rachel M. Colancecco, Note, A Flexible Solution to a Knotty 
Problem: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Relocation Disputes, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 
573, 604 (2009) (“[T]he best interests of the child standard has generated a substantial amount 
of criticism.”). 
232. Warshak, supra note 230, at 86 (citing Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A 
Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 508 (1988)); see also supra notes 128–32 and 
accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text (discussing the financial and 
budgeting “nightmare” caused by the open enrollment amendments). 
234. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (listing the statutory exceptions to 
the regular open enrollment period). 
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In the alternative, a balancing test should be employed by which 
school districts, the DPI, and Wisconsin courts might weigh the best 
interest of each student against the administrative, financial, and 
equitable implications that impact the effective operations of public 
schools.  In education law, the Supreme Court has developed balancing 
tests in several contexts to weigh the interests of the state in providing 
an efficient public service against the interest of the individual.235  
However, there must be sufficiently defined parameters.  Even where 
the best interest standard has been applied in other areas of the law, 
courts are guided by factors enumerated in statutes or developed 
through case law.236  For example, child custody and physical placement 
determinations in Wisconsin are guided by sixteen codified factors.237  
Similarly, guidelines for evaluating an application under the best interest 
exception should be developed. 
First, the primary motivation for the student’s requested district 
transfer should be considered.  Factors to consider include, but are not 
limited to, whether there is an imminent need for a change in 
educational placement, whether the student’s physical or mental well-
being is compromised, whether the district transfer is primarily for non-
academic purposes (including parent or guardian convenience or 
extracurricular activities), whether requiring the student to wait until the 
subsequent academic year would significantly impact the ability of the 
student to receive a quality education, and the opinion of educational 
professionals that have personal knowledge of the student.  Of course, 
the risk posed by retaining the best interest approach is that parents will 
not be forthright about the true reasons for transfer, which is likely to be 
less than altruistic.238 
Second, the primary motivation for district transfer must outweigh 
the administrative, financial, and equitable implications for school 
districts outlined in this Comment.  A consideration of the impact on 
 
235. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (applying a balancing test in the 
context of free speech that weighs the right of the individual against the government’s interest 
in operating an efficient and effective government service); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (applying a balancing test in the context of Fourth 
Amendment student drug testing). 
236. Warshak, supra note 230, at 99; Akre, supra note 131, at 638 (noting that “most 
state statutes delineate certain factors to be considered in determining the best interest of the 
child”). 
237. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(5) (2011–2012). 
238. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
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public school districts provides a more holistic determination, taking 
into account the best interest of all Wisconsin children rather than just 
one student.  As one commentator argued in opposition to the best 
interest standard, “by promoting the interest of [a] child in a particular 
case, one may work against the interests of children in general.”239  
Rather than focus on the individual at the expense of the collective, 
public schools should consider the cumulative impact of student 
transfers and the “broader educative effects of the law.”240  An approach 
that balances the interest of the individual student against the interest of 
the state is necessary to satisfy the Wisconsin state constitutional 
guarantee of a uniform public education for all students. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Expansion of the Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program obstructs 
local control over educational resources and as the United States 
Supreme Court stated in Martinez, “[n]o single tradition in public 
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of 
schools.”241  Although student transfers based on preferred 
extracurricular activities or parental convenience might be in the best 
interest of one particular child, this Comment urges policymakers to 
look at the bigger picture and consider the best interest of all children as 
well as the fundamental purpose of Wisconsin public education. 
At the end of the day, a system that pits one public school against 
another, thereby creating winning and losing school districts, inequitably 
impacts Wisconsin students and families.  Further, the expansion of 
open enrollment serves to facilitate the largely unregulated and 
ineffective virtual education industry.  Any attempt to rationalize the 
less than optimal education received by students left behind in the losing 
districts fails to take into consideration the fundamental state 
constitutional guarantee of “[a]n equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education.”242  In the end, the best interests of all Wisconsin students are 
served by returning to the more limited and controlled inter-district 
 
239. Elster, supra note 231, at 21.  Elster argues that “in addition to the interest of the 
particular child in any given decision, one must take account of the interests . . . of children in 
general.”  Id. at 32. 
240. Id. at 32. 
241. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 329 (1983) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
717, 741 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
242. Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 51, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388 (emphasis 
added). 
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